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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we propose a systematic methodology to construct an opti-
mized financial transmission rights (FTR) portfolio for the speculator, who
purchases FTR holdings in order to have returns that are as good as possible.
The conventional approach of selecting the FTR in a portfolio requires the
exhaustive evaluation of all the possible FTR combinations, which in a large-
scale network is computationally too demanding a task, particularly when
the wide variations in the behavior of the locational marginal price (LMP)
diﬀerences of nodes over the many hours of the holding period are taken into
account. In order to make the speculator’s problem more manageable, we
recast the problem into a form that allows us to exploit the salient charac-
teristics of power systems, the topological nature of the underlying network
and the historical data, so as to gain mathematical insights that we apply
to develop the proposed scheme. The speculator returns are collected from
the hourly day ahead markets (DAM s) only for those hours that the grid is
congested, i.e., the flows on one or more lines are at their maximum limits.
Each MW flowing through those lines incurs a transmission usage cost. Un-
like a physical transaction from a source node to a sink node that holds FTR
in the amount of the flow and receives reimbursement for the transmission
usage charges from the independent grid operator (IGO), the speculator who
holds FTR for the same node pair simply receives those revenues, because
of lack of physical flows. Thus, the identification of congested lines is a key
step in the construction methodology. So, rather than focusing on the LMP
diﬀerences of node pairs to choose FTR, we select node pairs such that the
selected congested lines are on their paths from the source nodes to the sink
nodes. Conceptually, we specify FTR such that transactions with same node
pairs and amounts induce real power flows on the selected congested lines.
The strategy of the speculator is to select each congested line and his level of
participation on the congested flows on the line. In practice, the speculator
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cannot do this for all the congested lines, because that would imply the ac-
quisition of too large a number of FTR, whose premiums add to his costs and,
thus, lower his returns. Under the assumption that the past behavior contin-
ues in the future, he judiciously chooses a subset of lines whose transmission
usage costs exceeded the speculator’s specified price and time fraction thresh-
olds historically. This subset forms the basis of the optimized FTR portfolio
construction. In our proposed scheme, we construct the FTR portfolio with
minimum number of node pairs; i.e., we find the minimum number of trans-
actions that induce the desired real power flows on the subset of selected
lines. To demonstrate the computational eﬃciency of the construction al-
gorithm, we select a subset of nodes to specify the FTR node pairs in the
portfolio. The manageability of the problem is further aided by focusing on
a small number of node pairs. Fewer node pairs improve the manageability.
The recasting of the problem in terms of congested lines, rather than LMP
diﬀerences of node pairs, results in a simplified solution methodology that is
amenable to practical implementation. We have extensively tested the pro-
posed methodology on multiple test systems and we discuss representative
case study results. The results on three test systems, including the PJM ISO
network, illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed approach and provide
insights into the nature of the problem.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we set the stage for the work presented in this thesis. Our
research interests lie in the construction of FTR portfolios for speculation
purposes. We start by discussing the motivation for, and the background
behind, our research so as to allow the reader to better understand the nature
of the problem considered and the solution we have developed. We also
provide a brief description of the current state-of-the-art in the field of FTR.
We then summarize the scope and the contribution of this work and outline
the contents of the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Overview of Financial Transmission Rights (FTR)
The new electric power paradigm provides a competitive market environ-
ment for the trading of electricity between buyers and sellers and ultimately
manages the physical delivery of bulk electricity. Independent grid operators
(IGOs) such as regional transmission organizations (RTOs), independent
system operators (ISOs) and transmission system operators (TSOs) are re-
sponsible for ensuring reliable operations, maintenance, and expansion of
a geographically widespread grid and for implementing appropriate mecha-
nisms for transmission pricing that lead to the eﬃcient and nondiscriminatory
use of the transmission grid by all market participants. Transmission service
is the most critical element in making competitive electricity markets work
eﬀectively. However, when the transactions that parties wish to schedule
result in the violation of a transmission constraint, the system becomes con-
gested and the IGO must take action to relieve constraint violations. Such
transmission constraints include thermal limits, voltage constraints, stability
restrictions on flows and emergency limits for specified contingency cases.
The actions that the IGO takes to relieve congestion are elements of conges-
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tion management, and include redispatch of the units and load curtailment.
The locational pricing model that makes use of nodal prices in electricity
markets is widely used by many IGOs for short-term congestion manage-
ment. Such prices are the outcomes of the day-ahead markets (DAM s) that
the IGO clears based on the sell oﬀers, the buy bids and the bilateral trans-
actions’ willingness to pay for transmission service. The market clearing
explicitly considers transmission network constraints, and so the market out-
comes in terms of the locational marginal prices (LMPs) reflect the impacts
of congestion in the grid. Indeed, the LMP may be diﬀerent at each grid
node [1]. LMPs may diﬀer at each location in the presence of transmission
congestion, since transmission congestion restricts energy flows from low-cost
generation from meeting the loads. Congestion costs, collected by the IGO
from the market participants as congestion rents, are evaluated in terms of
the LMP diﬀerences and may have serious impacts on costs of electricity.
For example, we show in Fig. 1.1 the costs in three North American ISOs for
the years 2000-2006. We note that these costs have reached as high as two
billion dollars for the PJM ISO in 2005. The LMP at each node determines
Figure 1.1: Congestion costs in PJM ISO, CAISO and NYISO from
2000-2006
the marginal cost of supplying an additional MW of load at that node for
an hour, and so each market participant buys or sells energy at the LMP
at a node for that hour. However, there is great volatility associated with
the LMPs as is evident from Fig. 1.2 [2]. Such volatility in LMPs results
in uncertainty in LMP diﬀerences and, in turn, in uncertainty in congestion
rents. This uncertainty creates the need for hedging instruments. One such
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Figure 1.2: The plot of the hourly LMPs at the Flatrur bus in the PJM
ISO network during September 2010
instrument is financial transmission rights or FTR, also known as transmis-
sion congestion contract (TCC ) in the NYISO and congestion revenue rights
(CRR) in the California ISO (CAISO) and the Electricity Reliability Coun-
cil of Texas (ERCOT ). FTR are successfully implemented in many IGOs,
including the PJM, New York, New England and Midwest ISOs. FTR entitle
their holders to receive reimbursement from the IGO for the value of conges-
tion as established by the LMP diﬀerence in the DAM. Thus, the holder of
FTR for a specified to and from node pair with a physical transaction with
the identical injection and withdrawal node pair is not impacted financially
by the LMP diﬀerence of the to and from node prices as long as the FTR
for that node pair is in the same MW amount as his physical delivery. The
IGO reimburses the FTR holder the same amount it collects in congestion
rents for that transaction.
FTR may be understood as financial instruments specified by their source
nodes, sink nodes and the MW amounts. FTR are strictly directional in
nature and that information is given by the source and sink node pair spec-
ification. FTR are further characterized by the holding period, which is
defined by the start and the end times and the class. The class refers to
the coverage subperiods and, typically, comes in three categories: on-peak,
oﬀ-peak and around the clock. The FTR tool is further categorized as either
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a contract or an option type. The FTR contracts provide reimbursements to
the holder whenever the congestion is in the direction specified by the FTR.
However, the contracts turn into a liability whenever the LMP diﬀerence of
the source and the sink nodes is negative, i.e., the congestion is in the oppo-
site direction. The FTR options are only exercised when the reimbursements
are beneficial to the holder.
The acquisition of FTR is either through grandfathering to “stakeholders”
by the IGO or through sales conducted by the IGO or secondary markets.
The IGO runs periodic auctions where it sells FTR holdings to buyers who
bid for the oﬀered quantities. The buyers may either be hedgers or specu-
lators. Hedgers buy FTR for insurance to receive reimbursements for any
congestion rents incurred as a result of congestion in the grid with their
transactions. Speculators purchase FTR even in the absence of physical
flows in order to maximize their earnings. Speculator participation in FTR
auctions results in a more competitive environment and may lead to higher
FTR premiums. The market participants, hedgers and speculators, submit
their bids for FTR by specifying the sink and source node pairs, the desired
MW amounts and the maximum willingness to pay in $/MW -duration for
each node pair. However, the market participants may only choose node
pairs from a specified from and to nodes, the so-called pricing node set. The
objective of the IGO is to maximize the bid-based values of awarded FTR
that are simultaneously feasible without violating any system and opera-
tional constraints for the FTR duration. The outcomes of the FTR auctions
determine the actual MW amounts and premium prices of awarded FTR.
The IGO is responsible for revenue adequacy, i.e., to ensure that the col-
lected FTR premiums are suﬃcient to pay oﬀ all future reimbursements for
the associated holding period.
In PJM ISO, FTR auctions oﬀer multiple products in terms of duration:
one month, three months, one year and three year holding periods; vari-
ous classes and contract and/or option type. Moreover, the primary FTR
auctions in which new FTR are issued fall in three categories—long-term,
annual and monthly—that provide various FTR products. As an example,
we provide a listing in Table 1.1 of the various primary FTR auctions and
the associated products in the PJM ISO. Each auction oﬀers FTR of the
three classes. In the monthly auctions, four possible squarters are oﬀered:
June 1 to August 31, September 1 to November 30 and March 1 to May 31.
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Table 1.1: FTR product types in the PJM FTR auction of year y for
long-term and annual auctions and month m for the monthly auction
auction type long-term annual monthly
date June, October April every month
FTR capability auctioned
system system FTR residual
capability capability minus capability
cleared long-term of the system
annual number of auctions 1 auction with 2 rounds one auction with 4 rounds 12 monthly auctions
FTR product type contract contract, option contract, option
FTR holding period
three year : one year one month
06/01/y + 1 06/01/y m/01/y
to 05/31/y + 4 05/31/y + 1 m/30-31/y
one year : m+ 1/01/y
06/01/y + 1 m+ 1/30-31/y
to 05/31/y + 2 m+ 2/01/y
06/01/y + 2 m+ 2/30-31/y
to 05/31/y + 3 three months :
06/01/y + 3 any complete quarter
to 05/31/y + 4 remaining in y
Besides the primary markets, there are secondary markets where FTR
holders may resell their FTR in part or in full. In these markets, FTR may
be split into products with shorter holding periods or MW amounts as long
as their sum does not violate the amount of the original FTR holdings.
The FTR auction determines for each specified product in terms of type,
node pair, class and holding period, the MW quantities allocated to the
buyers and the premium price in $/MW -duration. The associated revenues
for the FTR holders are determined by the outcomes of the DAM s that are
held during the holding period. We briefly review the DAM ’s structure and
outcomes to provide the setting in which the impacts of holding FTR are
evaluated.
We consider the centralized pool market structure for the DAM, which is
widely adopted in North America. The IGO collects the sealed oﬀers sub-
mitted by the sellers specifying the quantities and willingness to sell, the
sealed bids by the buyers indicating the quantities desired and the willing-
ness to buy, and the amount of transmission service requested by bilateral
transactions and their willingness to buy. The IGO uses this information
to clear the market and determines the outcomes to meet the demand by
maximizing social welfare. The outcomes specify for each buyer (seller) the
amount bought (sold) and the price and the amount of transmission ser-
vice to the transactions requesting the service. The physical transmission
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constraints, along with the operational and security considerations for the
operation of the power system, are explicitly taken into account in determin-
ing the outcomes. As such, the LMPs reflect the impacts of the transmission
constraints and are used to determine the congestion rents collected and the
reimbursements to the FTR holders.
1.2 Review of the State of the Art in FTR
The basic concept of FTR was first introduced by Hogan in a paper that
set out the mathematical framework for the analysis of the FTR tool [3]. A
more detailed treatment of FTR issues was developed later in 2002 [4]. The
implementation of FTR in various IGOs was accompanied by rules particular
to each jurisdiction [5], [6], [7], [8]. These implementations provide a good
range of realizations of the basic concepts of FTR. A comparative analysis of
the FTR implementations around the world would provide additional insights
on diﬀerent methodologies and rules that have been discussed in [9].
While the original objective in the introduction of FTR was to provide
insurance to entities with physical transactions, and in this way, to provide
hedging for those transactions, the use of FTR for speculation has been
discussed in [10]. The IGOs are keen to promote the liquidity of the FTR
markets and include the participation of entities without physical flows, so
as to make the FTR auctions more competitive. The original introduction
for FTR was for FTR contracts, which become a liability whenever the LMP
diﬀerences between the sink and source node pair become negative. Such
outcomes led to the investigation of the applicability of options to FTR [11].
No major hurdles with the introduction of FTR options in the ISONE market
were identified in the ISO New England (ISONE ) jurisdiction and the specific
advantages and risk aspects are detailed in [11].
A bidding strategy in FTR auctions, under the assumption of the charac-
teristics of the LMP diﬀerences by analytical probability distributions, was
developed in [12]. The salient mathematical aspects of FTR auction clearing
mechanisms and analysis of the FTR auction outcomes were topics of various
papers [13], [14], [15], [16]. A very useful and comprehensive survey paper
assessing the FTR literature is [17].
Since their introduction, FTR became a well-established financial tool in
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electricity markets. Their deployment is important to creating smoothly op-
erating electricity markets. The increasing utilization of FTR led to their
consideration in the analysis of transmission expansion planning and invest-
ment decisions. Several papers focus on the need to address FTR issues
associated with the expansion of the transmission network. Hogan identi-
fied the importance of FTR signal for transmission expansion [18]. The use
of long-term FTR to create incentives for transmission investments was dis-
cussed in [19], [20]. The eﬃcient implementation of such a scheme in small
incremental investments without major impact on the market value of FTR
was described in [21]. Such a scheme underlines the ability of FTR to provide
useful economic signals for transmission investment.
Thus far, the issue of constructing a portfolio of FTR for speculative pur-
poses has not been studied and reported in the literature. Since the role
of speculators is important in the competitiveness of FTR auction markets
and their participation adds to the liquidity of such markets, such issues
are certainly of interest in the FTR realm. We address in this thesis the
analysis and the solution approach of the speculator problem. In the next
section we describe the problem and summarize our proposed approach to
the construction of the optimized FTR portfolio for the speculator.
1.3 Nature of the Problem and Contributions of the
Thesis
A speculator purchases FTR holdings in FTR auctions in order to have re-
turns that are as good as possible. The outcomes of the FTR auction, which
determine the FTR premiums, do not solely depend on speculator, since
they are influenced by the behavior of the other market participants, specu-
lators and hedgers, as well as the supply of FTR oﬀered. Moreover, as the
speculator may not participate in the DAM s during the holding periods, he
has no control over the revenues emanating from the FTR holdings. There
is uncertainty associated with the FTR revenues since the outcomes of the
DAM s are uncertain. The speculator purchases FTR at a point in time for
use during the holding period and faces uncertainty in both the premium
prices and the revenues of the future holding period. We depict in Fig. 1.3
the timeline of the FTR purchase and use. In light of the uncertainty and the
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FTR auction start time hstart end time hend 
holding period 
Figure 1.3: The holding period associated with the FTR acquisition
large number of possible combinations of FTR he may purchase, the spec-
ulator faces a challenging problem in constructing a “good” FTR portfolio.
The speculator’s problem is too unconstrained, since there is not enough
information about the future stream of revenues. There is a need to find
a way to reduce the state space of solutions. An exhaustive evaluation of
all the possible combinations in a large-scale network is computationally too
demanding a task, particularly when the consideration of the wide variations
in the behavior of the LMP diﬀerences of nodes over the many hours of the
holding period are taken into account.
Rather, we focus on solving the portfolio construction problem for a sim-
plified form where we consider the acquisition in a single auction and the
purchase of FTR contracts for a specified holding period. Also, we do not
consider any other FTR holdings of the speculator.
We introduce some mathematical notation to allow us to make more con-
crete statements about the nature of the problem and the solution approach
we propose. We denote the FTR with source (sink) node i (j) in the MW
amount γ by the triplet
Γ = {i, j, γ} . (1.1)
The speculator’s problem concerns the identification of the elements of the
optimized FTR portfolio F , where
F ￿ {Γ 1, . . . ,ΓK} . (1.2)
For each Γ k ∈ F , we need to specify the triplet elements i k, j k and γ k, where
k = 1, . . . , K. However, even for the simplified setting of a single holding
period, the number of FTR combinations is huge. In order to make the
speculator’s problem more manageable, we recast it into a form that allows
us to exploit the salient characteristics of power systems, the topological
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nature of the underlying network, the historical data, and their economic
interpretation, so as to gain mathematical insights that we apply in the
proposed methodology. A grid has certain lines that are congested; i.e., the
flows on the lines are at the maximum limits. We associate with a line
where the flow is at its limit the economic term that indicates the marginal
benefit obtained from the last MW in the flow that results in the flow at its
limiting value. The charge for using the congested line is set at its marginal
benefit and the IGO assesses this charge from every transaction that flows
on that line. This charge is called the per unit transmission usage cost for a
congested line. From now on we will simply refer to it as transmission usage
cost. Indeed, the congestion rents collected by the IGO are the sum of the
transmission usage costs multiplied by the real power flow on all congested
lines, which are incurred by all the transactions, whose flows in part or in
whole, are along these lines. A transaction from source node i to sink node
j that has FTR in the amount of the flows receives reimbursement for the
transmission usage charges from the IGO. In this way, the uncertainty in the
nodal price diﬀerence during the FTR holding period provides the assurance,
once the FTR premium is paid, that there are no additional charges for
transmission usage. Similarly, a speculator who holds FTR for the same node
pair receives revenues equal to the additional charges for the amount in the
FTR holding, even in the absence of physical flows. Such revenues are exactly
what the speculator wishes to maximize, by also taking into consideration
the associated FTR premiums. Thus, the identification of congested lines is
a key step in the construction methodology. We therefore focus on a portfolio
construction strategy that allows the speculator to include FTR node pairs
with paths that have congested lines. From a study of historical data, a
subset of lines that, from past behavior, get congested may be identified.
Such lines result in FTR revenues whenever they belong to paths between
the source and sink node pair of FTR holdings of the speculator.
A particularly eﬀective way to select lines in the subset is to construct
transmission usage cost duration curves (TUCDC s) obtained by sorting the
hourly cost data from highest to lowest. The TUCDC abstracts out time
and, when transmission usage cost values in $/MWh are the ordinate and
the hours the abscissa, is monotonically non-increasing. We interpret a point
(h, ξ) on the TUCDC as follows. If the historical data set has H hours,
then for the fraction h/H of the time, the transmission usage cost exceeds
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ξ $/MWh. The area under the TUCDC gives the total congestion charges
on the line collected for each MW of flow over the H hours. We use the
TUCDC to identify lines that exceed two price and time fraction thresholds
specified by the speculator. We identify lines with high past values of trans-
mission congestion charges and call the associated transmission constraints
as chronic. The TUCDC are also useful to identify those lines that in the
past had very high values of transmission usage cost for a small portion of
the total hours. The transmission constraints of these lines are called outage
driven constraints. We make this concept more concrete by illustrating with
data we collected on the PJM ISO system for the year 2010. Our analysis
indicates that only 294 out of 19,787 lines get congested for one or more hours
of the year and that the highest fraction of time that any line is congested
is 30% of the 8760 hours of the year. In Fig. 1.4a, we depict the duration
curves of lines whose transmission usage cost exceeds the two thresholds, and
in Fig. 1.4b the duration curves of lines that do not.
The use of historical data may provide additional insights into the nature
of congestion in terms of the key causal factor. Such information is useful be-
cause whenever a similar situation would arise in the future, we would know
which lines would get congested. We choose the historical data accordingly
to be well fitted with the specific holding period. Based on past experience,
we focus on three main causal factors: demand levels, fuel price trends and
specific changes in topology. Chronic constraints are usually driven by de-
mand levels and fuel price trends. When the demand reaches high levels,
we try to meet it with the cheapest generation, which might lead to having
congested lines near the cheapest generation. We should be careful since if
the demand is met by local resources, the transmission system is not bur-
dened and no congestion arises. According to the same notion, the fuel price
trends determine which generation is cheaper. Some regulation of coal may
make coal units more expensive than gas units. For example, if we have two
areas, one with generation based on coal and the other on gas, the lines con-
necting the two areas might get congested if the price diﬀerence between the
two resources is large making one generation a lot cheaper than the other.
The outage driven constraints bind when a generation or a line outage oc-
curs. A line outage aﬀects the remaining lines diﬀerently, depending on the
grid structure. A particularly useful measure is the impact of a line outage
on other lines as measured by a sensitivity factor known as the line outage
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Figure 1.4: TUCDC s of 4 selected lines in the PJM ISO network for 2010
distribution factor LODF [22]. Under specified contingency cases involving
line outages, the LODF s may induce congestion in certain lines that are not
outaged. We make extensive use of these insights in casting the portfolio
construction problem to be focused on judicious selection of congested lines.
We recast the problem from the LMP diﬀerences of node pairs to congested
lines. We propose a methodology to solve the speculator’s problem where we
choose FTR such that the transactions with same node pairs and amounts
induce real power flow on the congested lines. However, we cannot do this on
all congested lines, because the speculator needs to acquire a large number
of FTR and his returns are decreased by the FTR premiums. We judiciously
choose a subset of lines and the level of participation on the congested flows
on the lines. We use the TUCDC to find the chronic and outage driven
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constraints and determine the key causal factor of congestion. If we believe
that similar events occur in the holding period we identify the lines in the
“specified congestion participation” subset. However, there are some lines
for which we may not specify the key causal factor of congestion, and their
behavior is unknown for the holding period. We choose FTR such that
such lines are not included in the FTR paths. We identify these lines into
the “zero congestion participation” subset. In the basis of the two subsets,
“specified congestion participation” and “zero congestion participation,” we
construct the FTR portfolio by finding transactions that induce real power
flow, according to the level of participation specified by the speculator, on
lines in the two subsets. In order to determine the possible node pairs for the
transactions, we choose a subset of nodes. This subset includes the terminal
nodes of the lines in the two subsets. If we considered all possible node
pairs, the computational burden would be large. However, by choosing the
terminal nodes of the lines, we know that part of an injection at a from or to
node flows through the line, and that transactions with node pairs from the
subset definitely induce flows on the lines in the two subsets. A great number
of transactions induce the desired flows on the lines in the two subsets. We
choose the solution that provides the minimum number of transactions, since
we associate the transactions with FTR and we achieve the minimum number
of FTR in the portfolio. For practical reasons it is very useful to participate
in the FTR auctions with the minimum number of bids. So, we construct an
FTR portfolio whose FTR have on their paths congested elements; therefore,
the associated revenues are non-zero.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis consists of four additional chapters and two appendices. In Chap-
ter 2, we review the analytical setting for formulating the speculator’s port-
folio construction problem. Specifically, we discuss the models deployed in
the FTR auctions to obtain an understanding of the costs entailed in the
portfolio construction. We also examine the modeling and formulation of the
DAM clearing problem so as to understand the nature of the revenue stream.
In addition, we recast the statement of the IGO market clearing problem to
gain valuable insights into the key drivers of congestion rents collected by the
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IGO and reimbursements to the FTR holders. We provide in this chapter
the key tools and insights we use in the development of the solution approach
to the FTR portfolio construction problem faced by the speculator.
In Chapter 3 we provide the steps of the approach developed to construct
the FTR portfolio. We describe the input parameters and how we trans-
form the speculator’s problem by focusing on two subsets of lines and their
transmission usage costs instead of the LMP diﬀerences of node pairs. We
determine the FTR specifications by finding transactions that induce on the
lines in the subsets the desired flows. However, there is a large number of
node pairs that could be taken into consideration. We exploit the physical
characteristics of the systems and choose a subset of nodes. The main con-
cept is the identification of injection and withdrawal nodes with the property
that part of the transaction flows through the lines in the two subsets. We
construct an optimization problem with the objective function of minimizing
the number of transactions such that they induce the desired flows on the
lines in the two subsets. We associate each transaction with an FTR and
construct the FTR portfolio with minimum number of node pairs.
In Chapter 4, we describe the subset of representative numerical results we
obtained using the proposed approach. The results are on three test systems
of diﬀerent scales: a 30-bus test system, the IEEE 118-bus network and the
PJM grid. We use the small system to indicate the mechanics of the approach
and to understand the capability of the scheme. For the 118-bus system, we
provide a set of sensitivity studies to test the robustness of the approach.
For the PJM ISO network, we show the eﬀectiveness of the approach for a
large-scale system. In our discussions, we provide insights into the results
and interpret them to give the reader a physical intuition for the nature of
the problem.
We provide in Chapter 5 a summary of the key contributions of the work
presented in this thesis. We also indicate directions for future research in the
topic. The thesis has four additional appendices. In Appendix A, we present
mathematical formulation of the FTR auction. In Appendix B, we give the
proof of the lemma used in Chapter 3 to construct the portfolio. The lemma
concerns the fact that the topological characteristics of the system limit the
number of lines on which we may specify the flows. In Appendix C, we give
a picture of the network topology of the IEEE 118-bus system and in D, we
provide the data used in the application studies of Chapter 4
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CHAPTER 2
MODELING ASPECTS IN FTR ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we review the modeling aspects that we make detailed use of
in developing the solution approach to the speculator’s problem. We start out
with a discussion of the modeling issues that formulate the FTR acquisition
and revenues in terms of the LMP diﬀerences. We then recast the formulation
of the optimal power flow (OPF ) problem used in the clearing of the DAM s
as well as in congestion management, to focus on the key role played by the
congested lines in the determination of the market outcomes. The recast
formulation allows the expression of the revenues of the speculator for the
FTR holdings in terms of the transmission usage costs of the congested lines.
The insights provided by the reformulation constitute a basic building block
of the approach.
2.1 Modeling Issues
We use the framework developed by M. Liu and G. Gross for the modeling
of congestion eﬀects and FTR evaluations [23]. This framework has the ca-
pability to allow the analysis of a broad range of problems associated with
ensuring price certainty for transmission services and provides the flexibil-
ity to analyze issues and design structures for the provision of transmission
services in the competitive environment. The framework includes the de-
scription of the financial markets and the DAM s. In order to present the
formulation of the clearing mechanisms of the FTR auction and the DAM,
we need to describe the physical network. However, the network may change
in every hour h of the DAM s and therefore we represent 24 diﬀerent snap-
shots for the hourly DAM s. We use a “representative” network to clear the
auction for FTR and we use a single snapshot for that network for the entire
duration of the FTR holding period.
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We consider a power system consisting of the set of (N + 1) nodes N =
{0 , 1, . . . , N}, with the slack bus at node 0 , and the set of L lines L =
{￿ 1, . . . , ￿L}. We denote each line by the ordered pair ￿ = (n,m) where n is
the from node, andm is the to node with n,m ∈ N , with the real power flow
f ￿ ≥ 0 whenever the flow is from n to m and f ￿ < 0 otherwise. We assume
that each bus is connected to at least one other bus. We consider a lossless
network with the diagonal branch susceptance matrix B d ∈ RL×L. Let A ∈
RL×N be the reduced branch-to-node incidence matrix for the subset of nodes
N /{0} and B ∈ RN×N be the corresponding nodal susceptance matrix. We
assume the network contains no phase shifting devices and so B T = B. We
denote the slack bus nodal susceptance vector by b 0 = [b 01, . . . , b 0N ]
T , with
b 0 +B 1
N = 0 ,
where 1N is the unit N -dimensional vector.
We use the network description to formulate the primary FTR auction
for FTR contracts. The FTR auction clearing mechanism is formulated by
considering a “representative” network topology for the entire FTR holding
period and by taking into account a list of contingencies. In the FTR auc-
tion model, the transmission constraints for the base case and the single-line
outage contingency cases are expressed in terms of the power (PTDF s) and
outage (OTDF s) transfer distribution factors respectively [24]. The auction
clearing mechanism is the same for long-term, annual, monthly auctions but
the oﬀered transmission capability changes accordingly. We formulate the
auctions in a way that may be modified to describe the characteristics of all
auctions. We consider the FTR auction consisting of a set of B buyers and
the IGO as the only seller. Each bid consists of {Γ , c}, where Γ = {i, j, γ} is
the desired FTR, with i the injection node, j the withdrawal node, γ the de-
sired amount to buy, and c the willingness to pay. A buyer’s b k bid for FTR
is represented by
￿
Γ
(b)
k , c
(b)
k
￿
, where Γ
(b)
k = {i (b)k , j (b)k , γ (b)k }, k = 1, . . . K (b).
The clearing of the FTR auction is determined by solving an optimization
problem, where the desired FTR are represented by actual transactions. The
objective of the optimization problem is to maximize the bid-based value
of FTR, with all the physical constraints not violated. An analytical for-
mulation of the FTR auction clearing mechanism is given in Appendix A.
The outcomes of the FTR auctions are the actual FTR amounts bought
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γ(b)k , k = 1, . . . , K
(b), b = 1, . . . ,B and the dual variables βM￿ and βm￿ of the
real power flow constraints for each line ￿. The actual amount for FTR Γ (b)k
is γ (b)k and the premium price is
c (b)k =
￿
￿∈L˜
φ
{i (b)k ,j (b)k }
￿ (β
M
￿ − βm￿ ) , (2.1)
where L˜ =
￿
￿i : i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, βM￿i > 0 or βm￿i > 0
￿
. The winning bid
representation of the kth FTR of buyer b is
Γ (b)k = {i(b)k , j(b)k , γ(b)k } . (2.2)
The FTR premiums and actual amounts are determined by the outcomes
of the FTR auction. The FTR revenues depend on the outcomes of the
DAM s. We formulate the DAM clearing mechanism. The state variable of
the voltage phase angle at bus n is θn, the nth element of θ ∈ RN . We state
the real power flow equations of the network and use p en (p
x
n) as the power
injection (withdrawal) at each n ∈ N and construct the N -vectors
p e = [p e1, . . . , p
e
N ]
T
px = [px1 , . . . , p
x
N ]
T .
The state variable θ is determined by the equations
p e − px = B θ (2.3)
p in0 − p out0 = bT0 θ (2.4)
The vector in RL of the real power flows on the lines of the network
f = B dAθ = [f ￿ 1 , . . . , f ￿L ]
T . (2.5)
The constraints on the real power flows are represented through the following
inequalities:
f ≤ fM
f ≥ −fm ,
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where
fM = [fM￿ 1 , . . . , f
M
￿L
]T
fm = [fm￿ 1 , . . . , f
m
￿L
]T ,
the values of the maximum real power flow allowed through the lines in L
in the same direction and in the opposite direction of line ￿ respectively. A
line ￿ is congested if the real flow through the line equals one of the line flow
limits, i.e., f ￿ = fM￿ either f ￿ = −fm￿ .
We state the hour hDAM problem for the set of S sellersS ￿ {s 1, . . . , sS}
and the set of B buyers B ￿ {b 1, . . . , bB}. The objective of these market
players is to maximize the societal net benefits given by the diﬀerence be-
tween the benefits
￿B
j=1 β
b j(p b j) of the buyers and the costs
￿S
i=1 κ
s i(p s i)
to purchase from the sellers. The power injection (withdrawal) p inn (p
out
n ) at
each n ∈ N is given by
p en =
￿
s i∈S is
at node n
p si and pxn =
￿
b j∈B is
at node n
p bj .
The hour h DAM optimization problem statement is
max
subject to
￿ B￿
j=1
β b j(p b j)−
S￿
i=1
κ s i(p s i)
￿
p e − px = B θ ←→ λ
p e0 − px0 = bT0 θ ←→ λ0
f = B dAθ ≤ fM ←→ µM
− f ≤ fm ←→ µm
(2.6)
We clearly indicate in (2.6) the dual variables corresponding to the various
constraints.
In order to determine the total revenues for hour h of the FTR portfolio
F ￿ {Γ 1, . . . ,ΓK}, (2.7)
where Γ k = {i k, j k, γ k} with holding period T = {hstart, . . . , hend}, we use
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the DAM outcomes for hour h and compute the diﬀerence between the source
and sink node LMPs, so as to determine the FTR revenues for F .
η
￿￿
h
=
￿
Γk∈F
￿
λ jk
￿￿
h
− λ ik
￿￿
h
￿
γk . (2.8)
The total revenues for the entire holding period of portfolio F are
η =
￿
h∈T
η
￿￿
h
. (2.9)
In this section, we discussed the modeling aspects of the speculator’s prob-
lem. We described analytically the environment the speculator participates
in to acquire FTR and the DAM that determines the FTR revenues. The
revenues are a function of the LMP diﬀerence of the FTR node pairs. The
high volatility of LMP diﬀerences and the large combination of possible FTR
node pairs makes the speculator’s problem diﬃcult to manage. Thus, we use
the DAM clearing mechanism formulation to recast the speculator’s prob-
lem into an easier to handle form, based on the insights we gain in the next
section.
2.2 Analysis of the DAM Clearing Model
We use the salient characteristics of power systems to recast the speculator’s
problem into a more manageable form. An LMP diﬀerence between two
nodes signals that one or more line flows have reached their maximum limit;
i.e., one or more transmission constraints is binding. There is an associated
dual variable with each constraint, which may be interpreted as the cost to
relieve each constraint. The dual variables of the transmission constraints
are indicated in (2.6) as µM and µm. We denote by µ = µM − µm the
transmission usage cost vector for the L lines. Lines that are not congested
have a zero contribution in the LMP diﬀerences, since their transmission
usage cost is zero.
In order to derive the relationship between the LMP diﬀerences of node
pairs and the dual variables of the transmission constraints, we use the La-
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grangian
L￿p e,px, p in0 , p out0 ,θ,λ,λ 0 ,µM ,µm￿ = B￿
j=1
β b j(p b j)−
S￿
i=1
κ s i(p s i)+
λT
￿
p e − px −B θ￿+ λ 0￿p e0 − px0 − bT0 θ￿+
(µM)T
￿
fM −B dAθ
￿
+ (µm)T
￿
fm +B dAθ
￿
.
(2.10)
The stationarity conditions are given by
∂L
∂θ
= −B T λ− b 0 λ 0 −AT B dµ = 0 . (2.11)
We use the ISF matrix Ψ to restate the relationship linking the λ,λ 0 and
µ, as
λ = λ 0 1
N −Ψ T µ , (2.12)
and refer to λn, n = 0, 1, . . . , N , as the LMP at node n and to µ =
[µ ￿ 1 , . . . , µ ￿L ]
T as the transmission usage cost vector. It follows that
λn = λ 0 −
￿
￿∈L
ψ n￿ µ ￿ , ∀n ∈ N /{0}. (2.13)
We interpret physically the relationship in (2.13) by considering an injection
at node n and its withdrawal at node n￿. We interpret φ {n,n
￿}
￿ as the fraction
of the transaction with node pair {n, n￿} of 1MW that flows on the line ￿.
We rewrite (2.13) in terms of the PTDF s so that
λn￿ − λn =
￿
￿∈L
φ {n,n
￿}
￿ µ ￿ . (2.14)
We next make use of the complementary slackness conditions of the opti-
mization problem (2.6). Clearly, µ ￿ = 0 for any line ￿ whose flow is not at
its limits. We define the subset L˜ =
￿
￿i : i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, µ￿i ￿= 0
￿
to be
λn￿ − λn =
￿
￿∈L˜
φ {n,n
￿}
￿ µ ￿ . (2.15)
In order to bring out the implications of the complementary slackness con-
ditions for every hour h, we represent explicitly in the equations that follow
the explicit dependence over hour h, as the results may vary from hour to
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hour. In particular, the market outcomes for hour h, denoted by
￿￿
h
, obtain
of the FTR revenues for Γ = {i, j, γ}:
η
￿￿
h
=
￿
λ j
￿￿
h
− λ i
￿￿
h
￿
γ =
￿
￿∈L˜
￿￿
h
µ ￿
￿￿
h
φ {i,j}￿
￿￿￿
h
γ . (2.16)
For an injection γ at node i and withdrawal γ at node j we approximate the
change ∆f ￿ in the flow on line ￿ by the PTDF of line ￿ times the amount γ:
η
￿￿
h
=
￿
￿∈L˜
￿￿
h
µ ￿
￿￿
h
∆f ￿
￿￿
h
. (2.17)
Clearly, (2.17) indicates that only the congested lines contribute to the hour
h revenues. We conclude, therefore, that for each hour h ∈ T , the revenues
η
￿￿
h
are purely a function of the transmission usage costs of the congested
lines ￿ ∈ L˜ ￿￿
h
.
We therefore focus on a portfolio construction strategy that allows the
speculator to include FTR node pairs with paths that have congested lines.
More specifically, the hourly revenues depend on the flows ∆f ￿
￿￿
h
that trans-
actions, with same node pairs and amounts as FTR, induce on the congested
lines. We may view the flows as a weighting factor of the transmission us-
age cost of each congested line. Our decision variables in the FTR selection
are the source and sink nodes and the FTR MW amounts. Therefore, we
use the relationships (2.14)-(2.16) to translate backwards, from a specified
flows amount on a congested line to the transaction amount γ that sets up
∆f ￿
￿￿
h
for every hour h. We use this insight as the key building block in the
construction of the FTR portfolio for the speculator problem.
In this chapter, we discussed the modeling issues of the FTR environment.
We determined the FTR acquisition cost in (2.1) and the FTR revenues that
depend on the outcomes of the DAM s over the holding period (2.6) in terms
of the LMP diﬀerences. We recast the OPF formulation of the DAM and
found a relationship between the LMP diﬀerence of a node pair and the
transmission usage costs of the congested lines (2.14). This insight is a key
element of the construction of the FTR portfolio. By using (2.14), we express
the FTR revenues in terms of the transmission usage costs of the congested
lines (2.16). We use the insights of this chapter to recast the speculator’s
problem and construct the FTR portfolio.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMIZED FTR PORTFOLIO
CONSTRUCTION
We devote this chapter to the detailed analysis of the FTR portfolio construc-
tion for the speculator problem. We start out with the qualitative statement
of the problem and introduce necessary assumptions to formulate a mathe-
matical statement. We describe the input data that the speculator provides
in the FTR portfolio construction model, i.e., his requirements. Instead, of
looking at the LMP diﬀerences of node pairs, we base the FTR portfolio
construction on set of congested lines. In particular, the speculator identifies
the lines into two subsets, the “specified congestion participation” and “zero
congestion participation”. We specify the FTR that have on their paths the
lines identified by the speculator. In order to determine the FTR node pairs,
we choose a subset of nodes to make the proposed methodology computa-
tionally eﬃcient. We construct the optimized FTR portfolio by choosing the
minimum number of node pairs that satisfy the speculator’s requirements.
3.1 Qualitative Problem Formulations and
Assumptions
A speculator participates in FTR auctions to acquire FTR, in order to have
returns that are as good as possible. A variety of FTR products is oﬀered in
the auctions. We focus on solving the portfolio construction problem for a
simplified form where we consider the acquisition in a single auction and the
purchase of FTR contracts for a specified holding period. Moreover, we do
not consider any other FTR holdings of the speculator. We denote the FTR
with source (sink) node i (j) in the MW amount γ by the triplet
Γ = {i, j, γ} . (3.1)
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The speculator’s problem concerns the identification of the elements of the
optimized FTR portfolio F , where
F ￿ {Γ 1, . . . ,ΓK} . (3.2)
For each Γ k ∈ F , we need to specify the triplet elements i k, j k and γ k, where
k = 1, . . . , K. We develop the proposed approach assuming that the network
is connected, lossless and has no phase-shifting devices.
We use the insights derived in Section 2.2 and no longer base the FTR
selection on the LMP diﬀerences of node pairs. Instead, we focus on the
transmission usage costs of lines to construct the FTR portfolio. We focus
on a portfolio construction strategy that allows the speculator to include FTR
node pairs with paths that have congested lines. Conceptually, FTR revenues
depend on the real power flow that transactions with same node pairs and
MW amounts as FTR induce on the congested lines of the system and their
transmission usage costs. However, the speculator needs to purchase too
large a number of FTR to include all congested lines on the paths of FTR
in the portfolio for every hour of the holding period and the FTR premiums
reduce his returns. Thus, the identification of a subset of congested lines is
a key step in the construction methodology. From a study of historical data,
a subset of lines that, from past behavior, get congested may be identified.
Moreover, we use the topological characteristics of the underlying network
to choose lines that get congested in the FTR holding period.
3.2 Mathematical Statement and Input Data
Requirements
We recast the speculator’s problem by using the insights derived in Sec-
tion 2.2 and focus on the transmission usage costs of the congested lines.
The speculator chooses FTR such that transactions with the same node pairs
and amounts induce real power flow on the congested direction of the lines.
However, the speculator cannot do this for all lines and therefore needs to
identify a subset of congested lines. We make use of the historical data and
topological characteristics, as described in Section 1.3, to focus on a subset
of congested elements.
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We use the TUCDC to neglect the lines that have a small impact on
the FTR revenues, because they get congested for only a few hours of the
holding period or their transmission usage costs do not exceed the price
threshold. Next, we identify the key causal factor of congestion, and we may
use oﬀer and bid forecasts and maintenance schedules to be able to predict
which transmission constraints will more likely bind, under the assumption
that the future is going to be a continuation of the past. We may specify
the subset of lines that will likely get congested, which we call “specified
congestion participation ” subset. However, there exist some lines for which
we may not specify a key causal factor of congestion. This is due to the fact
that the lines are aﬀected by various factors and in such cases we are not
in a position to predict their behavior in the holding period. We identify
lines with unknown behavior as the “zero congestion participation” subset,
such that the transactions with same node pairs and amount as FTR in the
portfolio induce zero flow on these lines and, therefore, the FTR revenues
are influenced by the transmission usage costs of lines in this subset. The
network topology imposes constraints on the ability to specify the flows on
all lines. In fact, the line flow restriction lemma, whose statement and proof
are given in Appendix B, provides an exact bound on the number of lines
whose flows may be specified. We make use of that lemma in the statement of
the problem and consequently in the input data requirements. Because they
do not get congested, the remaining lines form the “do-not-care congestion
participation” subset, which gives us flexibility in determining the node pairs
and amounts of the FTR. When we specify for the entire set of lines the
speculator’s participation, we may end up with an unsolvable problem, since
there is a limit on the number of lines over which we may specify the flows due
to purely topological considerations (Appendix B). Even if we specify the
speculator’s participation so as to have a feasible system, we over-constrain
our problem by specifying the flows on lines that are not congested in the
FTR holding period and, therefore, do not aﬀect the FTR revenues. By
focusing only on the two subsets, specified congestion participation and zero
congestion participation, we augment the feasible region. The speculator
specifies his requirements by the quadruplets
ζ =
￿
δ, ￿, z,L [c]
￿
. (3.3)
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For a particular line ￿, the element δ indicates the subset to which the line
￿ belongs: for δ = 1 line ￿ belongs in the specified congestion participation
subset and his level of participation is z MW under the contingency case
L [c], where L [c] = {lines that are outaged} or L [c] = {∅} in the base case
topology, and for δ = 0 the line belongs to the zero congestion participation
subset with z = 0 .
We make concrete the concepts of the two subsets, specified congestion
participation and zero congestion participation, by the illustrative example
of a 10-bus system, whose one line diagram is shown in Fig. 3.1. Based on
Figure 3.1: Network topology of the 10-bus system
topological considerations, discussed in Appendix B, the maximum number
of lines we may arbitrarily specify for the speculator’s participation is 9. The
fact that diﬀerent lines get congested for diﬀerent topological conditions is
illustrated in a 10-bus system by looking at two snapshots corresponding to
the base case and a specific contingency case. The snapshot of hour h provides
the base case, with all lines in service, and that of hour h￿ corresponds to
the snapshot when line (1, 2) is outaged. The resulting flows are given in
Fig. 3.2. We base the identification of the two subsets on the two snapshots
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of the system. At hour h the only line that is congested is line (7, 5) in
direction from 7 to 5. However, at hour h￿, which is depicted in Fig. 3.2b,
where line (1, 2) is outaged, lines (1, 3) and (7, 5) are congested. Line (7, 5)
is now congested in the opposite direction than that of hour h. We identify
line (7, 5) in the zero congestion participation subset, since the key causal
factor of congestion may not be identified and the transmission usage costs
of the lines might negatively influence the revenues if it is included in the
FTR paths. However, we may determine the key causal factor of congestion
for line (1, 3), since it gets congested due to the line outage of line (1, 2). We
identify line (1, 3) in the specified congestion participation subset.
On the basis of the two subsets, specified congestion participation and zero
congestion participation, we construct the FTR portfolio by finding trans-
actions that induce real power flow, according to the level of participation
specified by the speculator, on lines in the two subsets. We specify
subject to
F =
￿
Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,ΓK
￿
for δ = 0 : line ￿ is on their path and
the participation level is z in topology L [c]
for δ = 1: line ￿ is on their path
but with zero participation in topology L [c]
(3.4)
We discuss the method analytically in Section 3.3.
3.3 Solution Approach
We explicitly use the insights derived in Section 2.2 and determine the FTR in
the portfolio by determining transactions, which we associate with each FTR.
We wish to specify transactions that satisfy the speculator’s requirements,
i.e., to induce the desired level of participation on the lines in the two subsets
in the desired topologies. Let a transaction w be specified by the vector
w = [m,n, a]T , (3.5)
where m is the from node, n is the to node and a is the MW amount.
We propose a practical approach for a speculator to determine the num-
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.2: The subset of congested lines for (a) base case in hour h and (b)
the contingency case of line (1, 2) outage in hour h￿ of the 10-bus system
ber of transactions U and specify them once he has the V specifications
ζ 1, ζ 2, . . . , ζ V . Conceptually, the idea is to determine the number of trans-
actions U and the components of w u = [mu, nu, au]
T , u = 1, . . . , U . These
components must be selected in such a way that they satisfy the V specifi-
cations ζ 1, ζ 2, . . . , ζ V . The determination of the node pairs {mu, nu} is too
large a problem if we consider all the possible nodes pairs in N , since the
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number is of the order of
￿
N+1
2
￿
. Taking into consideration the large-scale
nature of today’s grid, we can easily see that the problem becomes extremely
big and computationally burdensome. We may select, however, a subset of
the network nodes by taking into consideration the physical characteristics
of the system. We choose the terminal nodes of the lines in the specified
congestion participation and zero congestion participation subsets, since we
know that part of an injection at a from or to node flows through the line,
and that transactions with node pairs from the subset definitely induce flows
on the lines in the two subsets. Since we associate a from node and a to node
for a line ￿, we limit our interest to the subset of nodes that are associated
with the lines in the two subsets.
H =
￿
g : g is either a from or a to node of line ￿ in
the specification ζ v, v = 1, . . . , V
￿
. (3.6)
As H, the cardinality of H , is considerably smaller than
￿
N+1
2
￿
, we reduce
the size of the computational burden to construct the pairs for possible trans-
actions. With the example of a 10-bus system in Fig. 3.1, we demonstrate
that an injection or withdrawal at a from or to node of a line has an eﬀect
on the line flow. We calculate the ISF s of all nodes for all the lines in the
system, with slack node 1. We order the ISF s by their absolute value in
Table 3.1. The ordering makes sense for lines that do not include node 1 as
either a from or a to node. We present the results for 4 lines and notice that
their from and to nodes are in the first 3 positions. So, it makes sense to
Table 3.1: Nodes ordered according to the absolute value of the ISF, with
respect to each line
line ordered nodes
(2,4) 4 3 2
(3,4) 4 3 5
(4,5) 5 7 4
(10,7) 10 7 9
choose the terminal nodes of lines in the specified congestion participation
and zero congestion participation subsets. We form the set U of ordered
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pairs of nodes in H with
U =
￿
{m,n} : m,n ∈H ,m < n
￿
. (3.7)
The cardinality U of U is given by U =
￿
H
2
￿
. At this point, the pairs of pos-
sible transactions are given by {mu, nu} ∈ U , for u = 1, . . . , U . However,
a transaction is specified by the vector w u = [mu, nu, au]
T . So, we need to
determine the amounts au for u = 1, . . . , U . If the solution produces au < 0
for some u ∈ {1, . . . , U}, we replace the transaction w u = [mu, nu, au]T
by w u
￿ = [nu,mu,−au]T ; i.e, we interchange the withdrawal and injection
nodes, and the amount is set to the negative value of au, since a transaction
amount must be a positive quantity.
The determination of the amounts au is obtained by writing an equation
for each ζ v, to be able to specify the transactions wu. For each v = 1, . . . , V ,
the transactions must induce flow z v in line ￿ in the contingency case L [c]
specified by ζ v. Usually, the topology refers to a representative topology
of the system, i.e., the base case, for the period under consideration, in the
same notion as in FTR auctions. However, in the cases where a line in one
of the subsets gets congested due to another line outage, then the network
topology changes. We formulate the solution for any possible topology. If
the topologies that are included in the quadruplets refer to the representative
case and the single line outage cases, we may simplify the problem by using
the PTDF s and the OTDF s of the representative topology. The eﬀect that a
transaction has on a line can be approximated by its PTDF for the specified
topology. The real power flow on line ￿￿ due to a transaction w = [m,n, a]T
is approximated by
￿
φ {m,n}￿￿
￿[c]
a. The total flow in line ￿￿ is approximated
by the sum of the products of the appropriate PTDF and the transaction
amount. Therefore, each specification ζ v, v = 1, . . . , V of the speculator
may be represented by
￿￿
φ{m1,n1}￿
￿ [c]
. . .
￿
φ{mu,nu}￿
￿ [c]￿ 
a1
...
au
 = zv or Φ˜ a = z , (3.8)
where row v of Φ˜ is constructed from the PTDF s of the network topologies
specified in each quadruplet ζ v. We determine the amounts au of the U
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transactions by solving (3.8). We notice that
rank
￿
Φ˜
￿
= rank
￿￿
Φ˜
... z
￿￿
, (3.9)
since the number of lines in both subsets does not exceed the number of nodes
in the system and the lines do not form a loop, so there exist transactions
that have the desired eﬀects on the lines. Furthermore, we see that
rank
￿
Φ˜
￿
< U . (3.10)
The dimension of the matrix Φ˜ is H × U . However U = ￿H2 ￿ and U is
always greater than H for H > 3. We assume that H > 3 because H is
the cardinality of the set H , and if the specifications ζ are greater than or
equal to two, then H is greater than 3. We know that the rank of a matrix
may not exceed the minimum number of either rows or columns, so we may
conclude that the system of equations in (3.8) is underdetermined.
There is a need to have additional criteria to ensure a unique solution. We
formulate the optimization problem of minimizing the p-norm of the vector
a subject to the constraints described by the system (3.8).
min
subject to
||a||p
Φ˜ a = z
(3.11)
For practical reasons, we choose p = 0 and minimize the ￿0 norm of a, i.e.
find the minimum number of non-zero elements that satisfy the constraints.
We use the ￿ 0 norm of an U -dimensional vector a
||a|| = lim
p→0
R￿
r=1
|au| p . (3.12)
This ￿ 0 norm optimization problem, referred to as the sparse approximation
problem [25], is hard to solve because of its highly nonlinear nature.
A technique to solve (3.11) is called the Orthogonal Matching Pursuit
(OMP) algorithm, which is known as a “greedy” scheme [26], [27]. The
OMP constructs iteratively an approximation to the solution.
An alternative approach is based on the relaxation of the equality con-
straints (3.11) to the inequality for a specified tolerance ￿, which achieves a
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solution with a greater number of zero elements in a. This approach explicitly
recognizes that the vector z is simply an estimate based on the speculator’s
analysis of the system’s behavior and incorporates uncertainty. In this case,
we formulate the optimization problem
min
subject to
||a||0
z − ￿ ≤ Φ˜a ≤ z + ￿
(3.13)
where the vector ￿ specifies the tolerance.
Once a is determined, the vectors specifying the U transactions wu =
[mu, qu, au]T , u = 1, . . . , U are known. However, we only need the transac-
tions with au ￿= 0 , and so select a subset with K elements, where K ≤ U ,
that have au ￿= 0 . Since the K transactions satisfy the V specifications of
the speculator, we may associate each transaction with the FTR for the node
pair {mu, nu} in the amount au to construct the portfolio. Thus, the set
F = {Γ1, . . . ,ΓK}, where {i k, j k, γ k} are given by
Γk = {ik = mk, jk = qk, γk = ak}, k = 1, . . . , K . (3.14)
Once we specify all Γk, we have the solution to the problem stated in (3.4)
In this chapter, we described the problem that the proposed approach is
solving. We suggest a methodology for the speculator to specify a subset of
congested lines that he wishes the FTR in the portfolio to include in their
paths, and formulate the optimization problem of determining the FTR in
the portfolio. In Chapter 4, we provide representative cases of the proposed
method on three tests systems.
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CHAPTER 4
APPLICATION STUDIES
We devote this chapter to illustrate the application of the FTR portfolio
construction methodology of Chapter 3 to representative cases on three test
systems. The test systems are a modified version of the IEEE 30-bus system,
a modified version of the IEEE 118-bus system and the large-scale PJM ISO
network. The small modified IEEE 30-bus system is an appropriate vehicle
to explain the advantages of the proposed methodology so as to avoid the
exhaustive evaluation of all possible FTR node pairs. For both the modified
IEEE 118-bus system and the larger PJM ISO network, we provide a wide
range of sensitivity studies to illustrate the well-behaved performance of the
optimized portfolio construction algorithm. In these studies, we demonstrate
the mechanics of the construction algorithm and discuss how we make use of
the physical grid characteristics and the insights we gain from the solution.
To make the discussion of the numerical results more manageable, we use a
one month holding period for FTR contracts in the portfolio.
We devote one section to present the results for each test system, and in
the last section we oﬀer concluding remarks about the numerical results.
4.1 Description of Test Systems and Overview of Case
Studies
We summarize the key characteristics of the three test systems and discuss
a number of representative cases on the three systems.
The modified IEEE 30-bus system used has 41 lines, whose network topol-
ogy may be found in [28]. The network topology of the system is depicted
in Fig. 4.1. We use the coeﬃcients of the IEEE reliability test system [29]
and scale the load to have a peak value of 796MW . We choose load and
generation oﬀer data to clear the DAM s for the FTR holding period in the
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Figure 4.1: One line diagram of the IEEE 30-bus system
system to be as realistic as possible. The buyer bids are fixed demand bids
which specify the MW quantity without any price information. Such bids
indicate an unlimited willingness to pay for the electricity purchases. Also,
we assume that the oﬀer price of each seller remains unchanged during the
period of one month and is considered to be a linear curve. The oﬀer data
are found in [30]. The modifications we made to the system may be found
in D.2. We refer to the modified IEEE 30-bus system as system R.
The modified IEEE 118-bus system is based on the ISO New England
(ISONE ) network and has 186 lines, as shown Fig. C.1. We use a scaled
version of the load for the ISONE of January 2010. The peak load of the
scaled version is 2, 922MW and we distribute it to the nodes. We treat the
load as price insensitive and we clear the market with the use of generation
oﬀers curves, which change once in the period of one month. We use the
oﬀer curves of [30] from day 1 to day 16 and the oﬀer curves in Table D.4
for the remaining period. As a result, the cheapest generation oﬀered varies
over the period of one month, causing certain lines to get congested. The
real power line flow limits are set to be 170MW for all lines and the changes
in topology are given in D.3. We refer to the modified IEEE 118-bus system
as system S.
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The PJM ISO system is truly large-scale, since it has 14,322 nodes and
19,787 lines. We use actual data of the transmission usage costs [2] and
decide on the lines in the two subsets. The speculator participates in a
monthly auction to purchase FTR with the holding period of September 1
to September 30 2010. We refer to the PJM ISO network as system T .
We provide a summary of the three tests systems’ characteristics in Ta-
ble 4.1.
Table 4.1: Key characteristics of the test systems
Test system description number of nodes number of branches
R IEEE 30-bus 30 41
S IEEE 118-bus 118 186
T PJM ISO network 14,322 19,787
For all cases in the three systems, the speculator uses historical data to
choose lines in the two subsets and his level of participation, and buys FTR
contracts that satisfy his requirements. For system R, we have two cases, one
where we construct the FTR portfolio considering all possible node pairs and
the other where we choose a subset of nodes to specify the FTR nodes pairs.
We also change the input parameters of the second case to test the robustness
of the methodology. The cases for system S are the construction of the
optimized FTR portfolio, with some sensitivity cases, and the construction of
the FTR portfolio by minimizing the FTR MW amount. For the large-scale
system T , we find the optimized FTR portfolio and run some sensitivity cases
to check the well-behaved performance of the methodology. We summarize
the scope of the case studies in Table 4.2. We discuss the results of cases
A-B in Section 4.2, those of cases C-D in 4.3 and that of case E in 4.4.
4.2 Test System R Studies
The speculator participates in a monthly auction and buys FTR of one month
holding period. We use the TUCDC s in Fig. 4.2 along with the key causal
factor of congestion to specify the two subsets and the level of participation
on each line. For example, lines (6, 7) and (22, 24) get congested due to the
changes in topology and the rest are mainly driven by the demand levels and
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Table 4.2: Test cases
Case Test system description
case A R
we choose all nodes
to construct the portfolio
case B R
we present the value of
choosing a subset of nodes
we modify the lines in the two subsets
case C S
we present the value of the
￿0 minimization
we modify the level of participation
in the two subset by steps of
2.5% from 0− 10%
case D S
we specify the portfolio
with minimum FTR MW
euclidean norm amount
case E T
construct the optimized
FTR portfolio
we modify the level of participation
in the two subset by steps of
2.5% from 0− 10%
are congested for a big fraction of the time. More specifically, the real power
flow of line (6, 7) reaches its limiting value when line (10, 17) is outaged and
that of line (22, 24) when line (18, 19) is outaged. Line (1, 2) is purely driven
by demand levels and is not aﬀected by the changes in topology. However,
the transmission usage costs of lines (6, 8) and (21, 22) are aﬀected by the
changes in topology and reach higher values in the contingency cases of single
line outage of (10, 17),(27, 29) and (18, 19) respectively. We may specify the
speculator’s requirements with the quadruplets given in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Input data for cases A-B
Input data
ζ 1 {1, (1, 2), 10, {∅}}
ζ 2 {1, (21, 22),−10, {∅}}
ζ 3 {0, (22, 24), 0, {(18, 19)}}
ζ 4 {0, (6, 8), 0, {∅}}
ζ 5 {0, (6, 7), 0, {(10, 17)}}
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Figure 4.2: The annual TUCDC s for the congested lines of the test system
R
Lines (21, 22) and (22, 24) get congested in the direction from 22 to 21
and 24 to 22 respectively. That is why we wish to induce a negative flow
on line (21, 22), so it has the same direction as congestion. The topologies
considered are three; one is the base case with 30 nodes and 41 lines and the
other two refer to a one-line outage that causes lines (6, 7) and (22, 24) to get
congested respectively. We need to determine the transactions that induce
the desired flows on the lines as specified by the speculator’s requirements.
In this small scale system, we may construct an FTR portfolio FA by con-
sidering all possible node pairs to determine the minimum number of FTR
in the portfolio. By solving the optimization problem we find the portfolio
FA =
￿{1, 2, 9.41}, {1, 9, 1.52}, {22, 21, 11.23}￿ .
For the computation of the revenues we make use of the outcomes of the
DAM s for the holding period. Our interest is in the mechanics of the al-
gorithm and we keep the data of the DAM s as simple as possible. The
associated revenues for FA are $ 692, 840.
We now evaluate the optimized FTR portfolio for the same input data
(Table 4.3), to show that the choice of a subset of nodes is meaningful by
comparing the results of case A with those of case B. We choose a subset of
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nodes, as described in (3.6), and specify the set
H = {1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 21, 22, 24} .
The possible node pairs for the transactions are given by the set
R = {(1, 2), (1, 6), (1, 7), (1, 8), (1, 21), (1, 22), (1, 24), (2, 6), (2, 7), (2, 8),
(2, 21), (2, 22), (2, 24), (6, 7), (6, 8), (6, 21), (6, 22), (6, 24), (7, 8),
(7, 21), (7, 22), (7, 24), (8, 21), (8, 22), (8, 24), (21, 22), (21, 24), (22, 24)} .
After solving the optimization problem, we specify the minimum number of
transactions and we associate them with FTR. The algorithm obtains the
portfolio
FB0 =
￿{1, 2, 11.42}, {7, 21, 0.25}, {22, 2, 10.62}￿ .
The associated revenues for portfolios FB0 are $ 662, 520, based on the out-
comes of the DAM s for the FTR holding period.
For case A and B, we observe, that the number of FTR in FB0 is the
same as in FA. However, we notice that the FTR MW amounts that need
to be purchased in the case of FA are smaller in total by 0.13MW than
those of FB0 . This is because an injection or withdrawal at node 9, which
was not considered in the case of FB0 , changes the real power flow on the
lines in the subsets to a great extent. However, the improvement of the
portfolio outcomes is negligible when we include all possible node pairs, and
the computational burden in doing so in a large scale system is big. We may
conclude that the method we use is suﬃcient and balances the computational
burden with achieving meaningful results. The revenues associated with
portfolio FA and FB0 are $ 662, 520 and $ 692, 840 respectively, indicating a
small diﬀerence. We discuss the cause for the diﬀerence in the revenues. We
consider the transactions corresponding to the three FTR in the portfolioFA.
The impact of these transactions is to set up a −10MW flow on line (21, 22),
i.e., a flow of +10MW from node 22 to node 21, in the base case topology, as
obtained from the PTDF s associated with those three transactions for line
(21, 22). However, whenever a line outage occurs, the flow on line (21, 22)
changes as given by the OTDF. Such line outage impacts are visible for the
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hours when such outages occur in terms of change in the values of the flows
of line (21, 22) and are shown in Fig. 4.3. Conceptually, any transactions
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Figure 4.3: The plot of the hourly real power flow on line (21, 22) of the
test system R associated with the transactions corresponding to the FTR
in FA and FB0
contribute to congestion. Absent transactions, the congested situation of
line (21, 22) ensures that the transmission usage cost contributes to the FTR
revenues, as derived in (2.16). The same arguments may be expressed for the
FTR in portfolio FB0 . In light of these insights, the diﬀerent revenues are
due to the diﬀerent FTR in the portfolio, and therefore, to the diﬀerent way
that transactions with the same node pairs and amounts as FTR impact line
(21, 22) for every hour of the holding period.
In order to demonstrate the well behaved performance of the proposed
scheme, we change the input parameters by adding additional lines in the
two subsets. The input data of the optimized FTR portfolio are given in
Table 4.4.
We construct the optimized FTR portfolio
FB1 =
￿{1, 2, 11.63}, {7, 2, 0.64}, {22, 2, 0.37}, {24, 2, 0.46}, {22, 21, 10.66}￿ .
The revenues of FB1 are $ 663, 410. Portfolio FB1 contains two more FTR
than FB0 . Two of the node pairs remain the same, but three new FTR are
introduced in FB1 . We depict in Fig. 4.4 the real power flow on line (6, 8)
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Table 4.4: Input data for sensitivity case of case B
Input data
ζ 1 {1, (1, 2), 10, {∅}}
ζ 2 {1, (21, 22),−10, {∅}}
ζ 3 {0, (22, 24), 0, {(18, 19)}}
ζ 4 {0, (6, 8), 0, {∅}}
ζ 5 {0, (6, 7), 0, {(10, 17)}}
ζ 6 {0, (6, 8), 0, {(10, 17)}}
ζ 7 {0, (6, 8), 0, {(27, 29)}}
induced by transactions with the same node pairs and amounts as FTR in
FB0 and FB1 . We may see that transactions associated with FB0 induce
non-zero flows on line (6, 8), when line (10, 17) and (27, 29) are outaged.
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Figure 4.4: The plot of the hourly real power flow on line (6, 8) of the test
system R associated with the transactions corresponding to the FTR in
FB0 and FB1
In this small scale system, we demonstrated that the selection of a subset
of nodes is appropriate for constructing the optimized FTR portfolio and
that the revenues of an FTR portfolio are determined by the real power
flows that transactions, with same node pairs and amounts as FTR, induce
on the congested lines. The speculator, by his quadruplets, specifies his
requirements, i.e. his level of participation on a set of congested lines, for a
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subperiod of the holding period. Two portfolios that satisfy the speculator’s
requirements have diﬀerent revenues because the transactions associated with
each portfolio aﬀect the remaining lines for the entire period and the lines
in his requirements for topologies diﬀerent than that specified, in a diﬀerent
way. Moreover, we presented that the portfolio is well-behaved when the
input parameters are modified.
4.3 Test System S Studies
The speculator participates in the January auction and buys FTR from Jan-
uary 1 to January 31. We use historical data of the transmission usage costs
and determine the key causal factor of congestion to specify the speculator’s
requirements. The TUCDC s from historical data of three months, appropri-
ately chosen to fit the characteristics of the holding period, are depicted in
Fig. 4.5. We specify the input data in Table 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: The three month TUCDC s for the congested lines of the test
system S
As an example, we chose the quadruplet ζ 7 = {1, (26, 30), 1, {∅}} because,
as we can see from the TUCDC shown in Fig. 4.6, the line is congested for a
big fraction of time in the past. Line (26, 30) gets congested due to the fuel
prices that aﬀect the oﬀer curves of generators. Based on historical data, the
generator in node 26 oﬀers cheap energy. So, since the speculator assumes
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Table 4.5: Input data for case C and D
Input data
ζ 1 {0, (8, 9), 0, {∅}}
ζ 2 {0, (64, 65), 0, {∅}}
ζ 3 {1, (89, 92), 1, {∅}}
ζ 4 {1, (38, 65),−1, {∅}}
ζ 5 {1, (68, 116), 1, {∅}}
ζ 6 {1, (9, 10),−1, {∅}}
ζ 7 {1, (26, 30), 1, {∅}}
ζ 8 {1, (8, 5), 1, {∅}}
ζ 9 {0, (38, 37), 0, {∅}}
ζ 10 {0, (30, 17), 0, {∅}}
ζ 11 {0, (65, 68), 0, {∅}}
that the future is a continuation of the past, he wishes to specify FTR such
that transactions with the same node pairs and amounts induce 1MW of real
power flow on line (26, 30). The TUCDC of line (68, 116) is also depicted
in Fig. 4.6. Line (68, 116) is driven by the demand levels, which make the
IGO utilize more the transmission network, causing the flow on some lines
to reach their maximum limit. Similar arguments may be used for the rest
of the quadruplets.
We next choose the subset of nodes that are terminal nodes of the lines in
the two subsets. So we choose the set of nodes
H = {5, 8, 9, 10, 17, 26, 30, 37, 38, 64, 65, 68, 89, 92, 116} . (4.1)
We construct the possible node pairs R as discussed in (3.7) and solve the
minimization problem with objective the ￿0 of the vector of amounts inMW
subject to the speculator’s requirements given by the quadruplets. The so-
lution to this optimization problem is
FC0 =
￿{10, 9, 1.00}, {26, 38, 1.50}, {65, 37, 0.73}, {64, 38, 0.16},
{65, 38, 0.36}, {65, 92, 0.14}, {68, 92, 3.22}, {89, 116, 1.02}￿ .
The minimum number of FTR pairs is 8 in order to meet the specula-
tor’s requirements and the total FTR amount is 8.13MW . The associ-
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Figure 4.6: The three month TUCDC s for lines (26, 30) and (68, 116) of the
test system S
ated revenues are $ 7, 467. We plot the LMP diﬀerences for the node pairs
{65, 38}, {68, 92} and {26, 38} for every hour of January in Fig. 4.7. We
notice that the LMP diﬀerences are positive for every hour of the holding
period. This is due to the fact that the paths of each node pair include the
congested lines in the congested direction.
We choose to relax the constraints in the optimization problem. We modify
the participation level of the speculator on each line as given in Table 4.5.
The optimization problem was
min
subject to
||a||
Φ˜ a = z .
(4.2)
We modify (4.2) by considering a new set of constraints
z (1− ￿) ≤ Φ˜ a ≤ z (1 + ￿) . (4.3)
We modify ￿ uniformly, in steps of 2.5% from [2.5%, 10%], and demonstrate
the results in Table. 4.6.
As we increase the value of ￿, we augment the feasibility region. As a result,
the outcomes of the proposed method include FTR portfolios with fewer node
pairs and less total MW amount than the FTR portfolio for ￿ = 0%. The
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Figure 4.7: The plot of the hourly LMP diﬀerences at 3 node pairs in the
test system S during a 31 day month
Table 4.6: Results of the sensitivity cases of system S
Sensitivity Symbol FTR portfolio number of total FTR revenues
cases ￿ elements nodes pairs MW amount ($)
0% FC0
￿{10, 9, 1.00}, {26, 38, 1.50}, {65, 37, 0.73},
8 8.13 7467{64, 38, 0.16}, {65, 38, 0.36}, {65, 92, 0.14},
{68, 92, 3.22}, {89, 116, 1.00}￿
2.5% FC1
￿{10, 9, 0.97}, {26, 38, 1.48}, {65, 37, 0.69},
8 8.10 6837{64, 38, 0.18}, {65, 38, 0.34}, {65, 92, 0.15},
{68, 92, 3.21}, {89, 116, 0.98}￿
5% FC2
￿{10, 9, 0.95}, {26, 38, 1.47}, {65, 37, 0.68},
8 8.06 7116{64, 38, 0.17}, {65, 38, 0.42}, {65, 92, 0.18},
{68, 92, 3.19}, {89, 116, 1.00}￿
7.5% FC3
￿{10, 9, 0.96}, {26, 38, 1.44}, {65, 37, 0.63},
7 7.88 7785{64, 38, 0.12}, {65, 38, 0.45},
{68, 92, 3.18}, {89, 116, 1.10}￿
10% FC4
￿{10, 9, 0.89}, {26, 38, 1.43}, {65, 37, 0.65},
7 7.56 7785{64, 38, 0.14}, {65, 38, 0.40},
{68, 92, 3.09}, {89, 116, 0.96}￿
minimization of the ￿0 norm has a close relationship with that of the ￿1
norm. Therefore, when we augment the feasibility region, the ￿1 norm of
vector a is also decreased, as may be seen in Table 4.6 and Fig. 4.8. We
notice that the proposed methodology is well-behaved, since FC1 and FC2
have the same node pairs but diﬀerentMW amounts andFC3 and FC4 have
one less FTR. The FTR revenues for each portfolio depend on the flows that
transactions, with same node pairs and amounts, induce on the congested
lines. For example, we depict in Fig. 4.9 the flows on line (38, 65) induced by
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Figure 4.8: The variation of the sum of the FTR amounts as a function of
the uniform tolerance ￿ in the speculator’s participation level for system S
the transactions associated with each portfolio. From Fig. 4.9, we see that
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Figure 4.9: The plot of the hourly real power flow on line (38, 65) of the
test system S associated with the transactions corresponding to the FTR in
FC1 ,FC2 ,FC3 and FC4
as we increase the value of ￿ the flow on line (38, 65) moves away from the
original value specified by the speculator at 1MW .
We use the input, given in Table 4.5, and determine the FTR portfolio
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with the minimum MW norm; i.e., we modify the objective function and
instead of the ￿0 minimization, we minimize the euclidean norm ￿2. The
FTR portfolio includes 136 FTR and the total FTR amount is 7.69MW .
The total FTR amount of FC0 is greater by 0.44MW . The FTR revenues
for FD are $ 7, 458. We demonstrate the hourly revenues of two FTR in
the portfolio {10, 5, 0.07} and {100, 8, 0.03} in Fig. 4.10. We notice that the
contribution in the total revenues of each FTR in the portfolio FD is very
small, but since their number is large, the total revenues are large.
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Figure 4.10: The plot of the hourly revenues for FTR {10, 5, 0.07} and
{100, 8, 0.03} in system S for the holding period
The diﬀerence in the revenues of FC0 and FD is due to the diﬀerent paths
of the FTR in each portfolio. As described in Section 4.2 the transactions
with the same node pairs and amounts as the FTR in each portfolio af-
fect the lines in the two subsets in diﬀerent ways for topologies other than
those specified in the quadruplets. In order to understand the diﬀerence
in the revenues, we also examine the flows on lines in the do-not-care con-
gestion participation subset. We focus on those that get congested, since
they impact the FTR revenues. For this case, this happens only for line
(100, 103). As shown in Fig. 4.11a, the line (100, 103) is congested for some
hours with transmission usage cost less than 1$/MWh. The real power flow
that transactions associated with each portfolio induce on the line are given
in Fig. 4.11b. Congestion in line (100, 103) is in the direction from 103 to
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100, so when transactions associated with FD have positive flows on the line
as seen in Fig. 4.11b the revenues of FD are reduced; in the case of FC0 we
have the opposite eﬀect.
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Figure 4.11: (a) Hourly transmission usage cost of line (100, 103) and (b)
the real power flow on the line (100, 103) of the test system S associated
with the transactions corresponding to the FTR in FC0 and FD
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4.4 Test System T Studies
The speculator participates in the September monthly auction and wishes to
purchase FTR that increase his returns. He makes use of historical data [2],
as described in Section 3.2, to specify his requirements. The speculator
determines two price and time fraction thresholds to specify the quadruplets.
We present in Fig. 4.12a and 4.12b, the TUCDC s of two lines: Doubs
and Albright-Sno. Since the two lines were congested in the past and their
transmission usage costs have high values, i.e., they exceed the specified
thresholds, they are included in the quadruplets. Similar analysis for the
remaining lines of the PJM ISO system is made and the quadruplets are
specified. Therefore the inputs to the proposed scheme are given in Table 4.7.
We next choose the subset of nodes that are terminal nodes of the lines in
Table 4.7: Input data of the proposed scheme
Line MW amount
Ruth 0
Millvill-Old 100
Millvill-Sle 100
Chuckatk 0
Mardela-Vie 100
Albright-Sno 100
Nipetown-Rei 100
Doubs 100
OX4 0
Halfway-Mar 0
England-Mdt 0
Kingwood-Pru 0
the two subsets and solve the minimization problem with objective the ￿0 of
the vector of amounts in MW subject to the speculator’s requirements given
in Table 4.7. The solution to this optimization problem is
FE0 =
￿{2761, 2276, 56}, {2806, 2276, 114}, {2664, 2416, 106},
{2512, 2682, 441}, {2512, 2710, 434}, {2512, 2761, 3},
{2664, 2710, 147}, {2761, 2727, 12}￿ .
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Figure 4.12: TUCDC s for 2 lines in the test system T based on historical
data of a nine month period
The minimum number of FTR pairs is 8 in order to meet the speculator’s
requirements, and the total MW FTR amount is 1313. We present in Ta-
ble D.5, the names associated with each node number. We depict in Fig. 4.13
the hourly LMP diﬀerences of node pair {2761, 2276} for September 2010, as
well as the mean value. We may see that the LMP diﬀerence is positive for
the biggest fraction of the month. However, the negative value indicates that
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Figure 4.13: The plot of the hourly LMP diﬀerences between nodes 2761
and 2276 during September 2010 in system T
a transaction from 2761 to 2276 induces flows in the opposite direction of
congestion in some lines. The mean value of the LMP diﬀerence is positive;
therefore, the FTR revenues of {2761,2276,0.56} are positive for the holding
period of September 2010.
According to the same notion as in Section 4.3, we relax the imposed
constraints by several values of ￿. The results of the optimized FTR portfolio
are shown in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Results of the sensitivity cases of system T
Sensitivity Symbol FTR portfolio number of total FTR
cases ￿ elements nodes pairs MW amount
0% FE0
￿{2761, 2276, 56}, {2806, 2276, 114}, {2664, 2416, 106},
8 1312{2512, 2682, 444}, {2512, 2710, 434}, {2512, 2761, 3},
{2664, 2710, 147}, {2761, 2727, 12}￿
2.5% FE1
￿{2761, 2276, 53}, {2806, 2276, 113}, {2664, 2416, 105},
8 1300{2512, 2682, 439}, {2512, 2710, 432}, {2512, 2761, 2},
{2664, 2710, 145}, {2761, 2727, 11}￿
5% FE2
￿{2761, 2276, 52}, {2806, 2276, 110}, {2664, 2416, 104},
8 1289{2512, 2682, 438}, {2512, 2710, 430}, {2512, 2761, 1},
{2664, 2710, 144}, {2761, 2727, 10}￿
7.5% FE3
￿{2761, 2276, 51}, {2806, 2276, 107}, {2664, 2416, 102},
7 1275{2512, 2682, 436}, {2512, 2710, 428},
{2664, 2710, 143}, {2761, 2727, 8}￿
10% FE4
￿{2761, 2276, 50}, {2806, 2276, 103}, {2664, 2416, 100},
7 1268{2512, 2682, 437}, {2512, 2710, 425},
{2664, 2710, 143}, {2761, 2727, 10}￿
The conclusions are similar to those derived in Section 4.3. It is interesting
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that the proposed methodology behaves well in such a large-scale system.
We notice that the outcomes of the proposed method include FTR portfolios
with fewer node pairs and less total MW amount than the FTR portfolio
as we increase the value of ￿ = 0 , as depicted in Fig. 4.14. We notice that
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Figure 4.14: The variation of the sum of the FTR amounts as a function of
the uniform tolerance ￿ in the speculator’s participation level for system T
the proposed methodology is robust, since FE1 and FE2 have the same node
pairs but diﬀerent MW amounts and FE3 and FE4 have one less FTR.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The studies described in this chapter quantify the range of benefits by us-
ing the proposed portfolio construction approach. We used the modified
IEEE 30-bus system to focus on the key results and the essential insights
obtained from the case studies, since such a small-scale system aids in the
understanding of the proposed method. The modified IEEE 118-bus system
is used to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed method for large-
scale systems. More precisely, we demonstrate not only the eﬃciency of our
approach, in terms of computational burden, but also the robustness of the
results, through a thorough sensitivity analysis. The implementation of the
proposed methodology in the large-scale system of PJM ISO indicates that
it may be implemented in real systems.
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From an extensive number of cases, a representative number of which are
discussed in this chapter, we gain insight into the determination of the FTR
revenues. The results made concrete that the revenues depend on the level of
participation that the FTR in the portfolio have in (1) the specified conges-
tion participation lines in the specified topology, (2) the specified congestion
participation and zero congestion participation lines in diﬀerent topologies
than those specified in the speculator’s requirements, and (3) the do-not-care
congestion participation lines.
In addition, we showed that the selection of a subset of nodes in the de-
termination of FTR possible node pairs is meaningful and reduces the com-
putational burden in large-scale systems to a great extent. Moreover, the
proposed methodology is robust, since the sensitivity cases show that the
node pairs of the reference portfolio, for ￿ = 0%, and the sensitivity port-
folios are the same for small values of ￿, but the FTR MW amounts are
smaller. For larger values of ￿, the number of FTR in the portfolio is less
than that of the reference case. These eﬀects are due to the fact that we
augment the feasibility region of the solution by increasing the value of ￿.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
We present in this thesis the construction of an optimized FTR portfolio for
a speculator. Since speculators are important players in the FTR auction,
the construction of an optimized FTR portfolio for speculators is important.
The uncertainty of the outcomes of the FTR auctions and DAM s of the
holding period results in uncertainty of the speculator’s returns, making his
problem hard to manage. We solve a simplified problem, in which all FTR
in the portfolio are contracts of the same holding period. In addition, we do
not consider any previous FTR holding the speculator might have. When we
focus on the LMP diﬀerence of the node pairs to select FTR, the number of
all possible combinations is too demanding a task. Thus, we recast the prob-
lem by using the insights we gained from the analysis of the DAM clearing
mechanism in Section 2.2, and base the FTR selection on the transmission
usage costs of the congested lines.
More specifically, we select FTR that have congested lines in their paths
from the source to the sink nodes. However, not all congested lines may be on
the FTR paths for every hour of the holding period. Thus, we select a subset
of lines by using historical data and topological characteristics of the under-
lying network. In particular, we use the TUCDC s of each line and specify
two price and time fraction thresholds to reduce the number of lines we wish
to include in the FTR paths. In addition, we determine the key causal factor
of congestion, such as demand levels, fuel price trends and topology changes,
to find which lines are likely to get congested in the holding period. On
this basis the two subsets of lines, “specified congestion participation” and
“zero congestion participation,” are identified, as described in Section 3.2.
Conceptually, we specify FTR such that transactions with the same node
pairs and amounts as FTR induce real power flow, according to the desired
level of participation, on the lines in the two subsets. In order to specify the
transaction node pairs we choose a subset of nodes, taking into consideration
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the physical characteristics of the system. We construct the FTR portfolio
with minimum number of node pairs; i.e., we specify the minimum number of
transactions that cause the desired level of congestion participation on lines
in the two subsets. We present a number of representative cases to show the
implementation of the proposed method in diﬀerent scale systems and check
its robustness.
There are a number of natural extensions of the work presented here. The
same approach may be extended to applications for hedging purposes. In such
cases, the physical flows of the traders must be taken into account. However,
the common characteristics of the hedging and speculative problems can
be exploited in designing a practical solution approach. In particular, the
modifications needed to recast the problem to the identification of a subset
of congested lines requires further study.
Moreover, the portfolio definition may be extended to include additional
aspects of the FTR problem such as the impacts of existing holdings and
the ability to purchase and sell multiple FTR products, including diﬀerent
holding periods and FTR types. In such cases, the complexity of the problem
is increased, but the insights we gained from the analysis of the DAM clearing
mechanism still hold and can be exploited to construct practical solutions.
Another extension is the investigation of the formulation of bidding strate-
gies in the FTR auction that are explicitly based on the speculator’s require-
ments, such as the specification of the subset of congested lines chosen and
the associated levels of participation. This problem can be addressed by de-
veloping mathematical insights from the formulation of the auction clearing
mechanism. Furthermore, the development of metrics to quantify the risks
associated with holding FTR, such as value at risk and conditional value at
risk, is a good topic for further study.
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APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF
THE FTR AUCTION
We use the network description in Section 2.1 to formulate the primary FTR
auction for FTR contracts. In the FTR auction model, the transmission con-
straints for the base case and the single-line outage contingency cases are ex-
pressed in terms of the PTDF s (φ {i,j}￿ ) and OTDF s (ν
{i,j}
￿ ￿￿ ). A buyer’s b k bid
for FTR is represented by
￿
Γ
(b)
k , c
(b)
k
￿
, where Γ
(b)
k = {i (b)k , j (b)k , γ (b)k }, k =
1, . . . K (b). The clearing of the FTR auction is determined by solving an
optimization problem, where the desired FTR are represented by actual
transactions. The objective of the optimization problem is to maximize the
bid-based value of FTR, with all the physical constraints not violated. We
formulate the FTR auction clearing mechanism as follows:
max
subject to
B￿
b=1
K(b)￿
k=1
c(b)k γ
(b)
k
B￿
b=1
K(b)￿
k=1
φ
{i (b)k ,j (b)k }
￿ γ
(b)
k ≤ ζ ￿ fM￿ , ￿ = ￿ 1, . . . , ￿L ←→ βM￿
B￿
b=1
K(b)￿
k=1
φ
{i (b)k ,j (b)k }
￿ γ
(b)
k ≥ −ζ ￿ fm￿ , ￿ = ￿ 1, . . . , ￿L ←→ βm￿
B￿
b=1
K(b)￿
k=1
ν
{i (b)k ,j (b)k }
￿ ￿￿ γ
(b)
k ≤ ζ ￿ fM￿ , ￿, ￿￿ = ￿ 1, . . . , ￿L : ￿￿ ￿= ￿
B￿
b=1
K(b)￿
k=1
ν
{i (b)k ,j (b)k }
￿ ￿￿ γ
(b)
k ≥ −ζ ￿ fm￿ , ￿, ￿￿ = ￿ 1, . . . , ￿L : ￿￿ ￿= ￿
(A.1)
where ζ ￿ is the available system capability for each FTR auction.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE LINE FLOW
RESTRICTION LEMMA
We consider a power system consisting of the set of (N + 1) nodes N =
{0 , 1, . . . , N}, with the slack bus at node 0 , and the set of L lines L . We
assume that the power system is lossless and that the DC power flow condi-
tions hold. We use the notation G (N ,L ) to denote the undirected graph
associated with the network.
Proposition 1. In the connected network {N ,L }, the minimum number
of lines L is N .
Proof. We prove this proposition by making use of the graph G (N ,L ).
A network is connected if and only if there exists a path from every node
to any other node of the network {N ,L } [31, p.3]. A connected network
with a minimum number of lines is called a tree. Any tree of the network
with the set of nodes N contains N lines [31, pp.115-116]. The minimum
number of lines in a connected network {N ,L } is N . This minimality
characterization of a tree implies that the connected network is characterized
by |L | = L ≥ N .
Proposition 2. In a connected network {N ,L }, we can specify the flows
on any set of K lines as long as a loop does not exist in the set of lines.
Proof. We prove the proposition by contradiction. We choose a set of lines,
some of which form a loop, and then show that we may not specify the flows
on all the K lines. We denote the subset K ⊂ L of the K selected lines by
K = {￿1 = (i1, j1), ￿2 = (i2, j2), . . . , ￿K = (iK , jK)}. Since a loop exists, we
denote by K ￿ ⊂ K , K ￿ = {￿￿1 = (i￿1, j￿1), ￿￿2 = (i￿2, j￿2), . . . , ￿￿K￿ = (i￿K￿ , j￿K￿)},
the subset of lines that form the loop. The elements of K ￿ are ordered so
that i￿k = j
￿
k−1, k = 2, . . . , K
￿ and i￿1 = j
￿
K￿ . The active power flow P￿ on line
￿ = (i, j) satisfies
P￿ = (θj − θi) bij , (B.1)
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where θi (θj) is the voltage phase angle at node i (j) and bij is the susceptance
of the line ￿. The set of active power flow equations for the lines in K ￿ forms
the system of equations
Pˆ ￿ = Σˆ θˆ , (B.2)
where
Pˆ ￿ =

P￿￿1
P￿￿2
...
P￿￿
K￿
 , Σˆ =

σ T1
σ T2
...
σ TK￿
 =

bj￿
K￿j
￿
1
0 . . . 0 −bj￿
K￿j
￿
1
−bj￿1j￿2 bj￿1j￿2 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . −bj￿
K￿−1j
￿
K￿
bj￿
K￿−1j
￿
K￿

and θˆ =

θj￿1
θj￿2
...
θj￿
K￿
 .
The rank of the matrix Σˆ is less than K ￿ since any row may be expressed
as a linear combination of all the other rows of the matrix. This fact stems
from the relationship
σ Tk =

−
K￿￿
µ=1
µ ￿=k
bj￿
K￿ j
￿
1
bj￿µ−1j￿µ
σ Tµ k = 1
−
K￿￿
µ=1
µ ￿=k
bj￿
k−1j￿k
bj￿µ−1j￿µ
σ Tµ k = 2, . . . , K
￿ .
(B.3)
Another way of writing (B.3) is
K￿￿
k=1
ak σ
T
k = 0
T or aT Σˆ = 0 T , (B.4)
where ak are determined by (B.3), a1, a2, . . . , aK￿ not all 0 , aT = [a1, a2, . . . , aK￿ ]
and 0 T = [0 , 0 , . . . , 0￿ ￿￿ ￿
K￿ elements
]. We use (B.4) to prove that there exists a relationship
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between the elements of vector Pˆ ￿
aT Pˆ ￿ = a
T Σˆ θˆ = 0 T θˆ = 0 . (B.5)
It follows that for the K ￿ lines in K , we may at most specify the flows on
K ￿ − 1 lines. As a result, for K lines in K ⊃ K ￿, we may at most specify
the flows on K − 1 lines, which contradicts the proposition statement.
The result in Proposition 2 implies that K ≤ N , since the smallest number
of lines in a connected network without a loop is always that of a tree.
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APPENDIX C
NETWORK TOPOLOGY OF IEEE
118-BUS SYSTEM
Figure C.1 shows the network topology of the IEEE 118-bus system.
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APPENDIX D
DATA USED IN THE APPLICATION
STUDIES
Tables D.1-D.2 give the data used in the cases for system R, Tables D.3-D.4
those used in the cases for system R and Table D.5 gives the names of the
buses in system T .
Table D.1: Real power flow limits of the 30-bus system
line maximum real power flow (MW)
(1, 2) 30
(6, 7) 5
(22, 24) 15
(6, 8) 25
(12, 15) 20
(21, 22) 30
remaining 100
lines
Table D.2: Lines outages in the period of one month for the 30-bus system
day line outaged
5 (27, 29)
6 (2, 6)
13 (27, 30)
15 (10, 17)
24 (6, 10)
28 (18, 19)
29 (29, 30)
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Table D.3: Lines outages in the period of one month for the 118-bus system
day line outaged
15 (1, 3)
17 (80, 98)
19 (105, 106)
20 (18, 19)
21 (105, 107)
23 (76, 77)
24 (14, 15)
25 (37, 40)
26 (110, 111)
27 (100, 104)
Table D.4: Oﬀer curves of generators for half of January in the 118-bus
system: ci(Pi) = α1 P 2i + α2 Pi
node α1 α2
1 0.917 40
4 0.286 40
6 0.757 40
8 0.754 40
10 0.380 20
12 0.568 20
15 0.076 40
18 0.054 40
19 0.531 40
24 0.779 40
25 0.934 20
26 0.130 20
27 0.569 40
31 0.469 20
32 0.012 40
34 0.337 40
36 0.162 40
40 0.794 40
42 0.311 40
46 0.529 20
49 0.166 20
54 0.602 20
55 0.263 40
56 0.654 40
59 0.689 20
61 0.748 20
62 0.451 40
node α1 α2
65 0.084 20
66 0.229 20
69 0.913 20
70 0.152 40
72 0.826 40
73 0.538 40
74 0.996 40
76 0.078 40
77 0.443 40
80 0.107 20
85 0.962 40
87 0.005 20
89 0.775 20
90 0.817 40
91 0.869 40
92 0.084 40
99 0.400 40
100 0.260 20
103 0.800 20
104 0.431 40
105 0.911 40
107 0.182 40
110 0.264 40
111 0.146 20
112 0.136 40
113 0.869 40
116 0.580 40
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Table D.5: Names of nodes in F0 for the PJM ISO network
node number name
2276 MASSEY
2416 ALBRIGHT
2512 DRYRUN
2664 MARLOWE
2682 MIRACLER
2710 NLONGVW
2727 OPEQUON
2761 RIDGELEY
2806 SOAKFORD
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